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The distributional effects of increasing illegal immigration have drawn increasing 
attention from researchers and alarmed policy-makers both within and outside the 
country. This thesis theoretically offers an examination via constructing two dif-
ferent illegal immigration models in a heterogeneous society and then explores the 
effects of illegal immigration on income distribution through a sensitivity analysis 
on each of them. 
We first develop a Solow model, in which the theoretical result and sensitivity analy-
sis show that increasing illegal immigration does worsen social wealth inequality, al-
though it is a boom to the economy as a whole. However in the Ramsey model, the-
oretical and sensitivity analyse show that illegal immigration worsens social wealth 
inequality to a lesser degree because the endogenous saving feature of household in 
the Ramsey model lessens the social inequality. Additionally, we find that the initial 
endowment of capital affects the steady state value of capital and the consumption 
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List of Variables 
L : Size of total labor force in host country 
K : Capital level 
M : Size of illegal immigration 
Li : Size of domestic lab or i ( i = 1, 2, 1 for unskilled, 2 for skilled) 
Ki : Capital of domestic labor i ( i = 1, 2, 1 for unskilled, 2 for skilled) 
Y : Output level 
C : Consumption 
F(K, L 1 + L2, 1\11): Production function 
IT : Profit earned by firm 
k: Capital per worker, equal to Kl L 
y: Output per worker, equal to Fl L 
m : ratio of illegal immigration over totallocallabor force, equal to M I L 
cjJ : shares of unskilled worker in total labor force, equal to L1 I L 
ki : Capital per domestic labor i, equal to Kil Li ( i = 1, 2, 1 for unskilled, 
2 for skilled) 
Ci : Consumption per domestic labor i, equal to Kil Li (i = 1, 2, 1 for 
unskilled , 2 for skilled) 
Wi : Wage per domestic labor i, equal to Kil Li (i = 1, 2, 1 for unskilled, 
2 for skilled) 
e : Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
s : Saving rate 
p : Discounting factor 
r : penalty ratio 
c5 : Depreciation rate of ea pi tal 




Over the last few decades, illegal immigration has drawn increasing attention from 
many economists. Both developed and developing countries exhibit an increasing 
number of illegal immigration as the globalization of the economy enhances the 
mobility of labor and resources. Related debates, both politically and economi-
cally, are on going. Mexican illegal immigrants to the US is the most widely cited 
case. In particular, according the 2006 Gallup polls, immigration is considered as 
the second most important problem facing the country. Further more, in Europe, 
more and more of the labor force immigrate from Southern America, or Eastern 
Europe to Spain or other European countries. According to Trends in International 
Migration (1994) by OECD, from 1981 to 1991, the percentage of immigration in 
the whole population of 15 developed European countries increased by 0.4 to 2. 7 
(including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States). 
In reality, most of the illegal immigration exist in developed economies because 
poor people from undeveloped countries have more incentives to risk getting caught 
and cross the border just to earn higher wages on the other side. Numerous problems 
are related to illegal immigration. For example, what determines the immigration 
decision? How does immigration affect the job market of the host country? What 
are the characteristics of these immigrants? However, in this paper, we only try 
to answer two questions. First, what is the income distributional effects of illegal 
1 
immigration? In other words, will the social wealth inequality (capital and con-
sumption) become worse due to illegal immigration? More specifically, in a society 
with heterogeneous labor, what is the effects on different individuals? Second, after 
we have a preliminary understanding of the first question, we would like to know 
further, what are the effects of the other parameters? How robust are these effects 
on our model? As different model settings will probably lead to different analytical 
results, we also construct our analysis on the Solow and Ramsey model, respectively, 
in order to shed some light on the robustness of the results. 
1.2 Literature on Illegal Immigration 
Literature on immigration is huge but that on illegal immigration is relatively few. 
For a full coverage of the literature on immigration, George Borjas (1999) made a 
comprehensive one covering most of the important and basic economic analysis of 
immigration. 
As a pioneering work on illegal immigration, Ethier (1966) introduced a model 
to discuss the border enforcement of immigration, and related income distributional 
issues. In a neoclassical production function, Ethier focused on the border enforce-
ment mechanism, associating penalty, tax on domestic skilled lab or, and the respec-
tive wages effects of native and illegal immigrants. Based on these, he concluded that 
different interdiction policies can have different effects on domestic wages. Most es-
pecially, border enforcement policy can probably reduce national income. His work 
included considerations about income distribution, but the discussion was on a social 
level from the perspective of the government. 
Following extended analysis include Bond and Chen(1987). In a two-country 
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model with a focus on capital mobility, they examined the optimal penalty levels to 
achieve maximum social welfare. They showed that with different degrees of capital 
mobility, penalty can have different effects on income distribution. However, foreign 
workers will lose if capital mobility is excluded from the framework. 
Survey by Greenwood and McDowell (1986) suggested that illegal immigrations 
decrease the wages and the employment rate of domestic unskilled workers in the 
cases of the USA and Europe. Djajic (1997) showed that if capital is perfectly 
mobile, then the inflow of the illegal foreign worker will have no effect on the wages 
of natives in the long run. Under certain situations (when only illegal immigrants 
occupy the underground economy), both unskilled and skilled natives will benefit 
from the illegal lab or inflow. 
Theoretical work on illegal immigration varies in assumption, and thus in the 
framework and results. Thus the debate is still on going. However the robustness of 
the previous results are doubtable. Let us look at some facts and empirical studies. 
Empirical work on immigration has shed some light on the issue from another 
perspective. A cross-section data study by J.Grossman (1982) shows that a 10 
percent inflow of immigration labor can reduce domestic wage by 1 percent. Other 
methods include natural experiment by Card (1990) and Hunt (1992). In a time 
series study, Pope and Withers (1993) disproved the positive relationship between 
immigration and Australian native workers. 
Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt (1995)'s survey is a comprehensive one on immigra-
tion literature including most important framework and empirical methods, mainly 
in labor economics. They concluded that the effect of immigration on the labor 
markets of natives is small. Using US date from 1960 to 2000, Borjas (2003) argued 
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that increasing immigration will lead to the decrease of the native wage, In a recent 
work , Ottatiano and Peri (2006) showed the positive relationship between immigra-
tion and the average wage of US native workers both in the short run and long run, 
but they further claimed that effects on the wages of domestic workers was not as 
much as that in the study by Borjas. 
According to the American Statistical Yearbook (1994), immigration growth 
increased from 13 percent in the 1960s to 19 percent in the 1970s and 25 percent in 
the 1980. Apparently, this trend has drawn much of the economists' attention. The 
distributional effects, especially effects on the wages of domestic labor and economic 
growth , have been frequently discussed in literature in the last 20 years. 
1.3 Literature on Income Distribution 
In this part , we focus on the evolvement of income distribution and related key 
factors. As we are examining the income distributional results of illegal immigration, 
it is necessary to obtain a clear picture about income distribution. 
Income distribution has always been one of the central problems in economics 
since Adam Smith, Ricardo, Neoclassical Keynesian, and post-Keynesian. Simon 
Kuznets (1955) probed vast problems on this topic including the interaction between 
individual income distribution and economic growth, the composition of personal 
income distribution, and so on. 
Stigliz (1969) studied the distributional effects from two key factors: heteroge-
neous labor and saving behavior, both of which affect or even preserve inequality 
in wealth and income. There are similarities in our framework . First, our analy-
sis is based on the neoclassical growth model with two kinds of labor: skilled and 
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unskilled. Secondly, because saving behavior is important in the conclusion of past 
literature, we will look into that as well by comparing the economic analysis between 
the Solow model and the Ramsey model. 
Satyajit Chatterjee (1994) 's work is important for our analysis. He studied the 
evolution of wealth distribution through the one-sector neoclassical model. Specifi-
cally, through a competitive dynamics analysis, he drew the conclusion that a more 
equal initial wealth distribution will lead to a more equal economy in the future, and 
that the further away initial capital distribution is from the steady state, the more 
rapid would the economy move to the steady sate and the faster the distributional 
changes will be. Similarly, we noticed that different initial value capital endowments 
do affect the steady state value. 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) focused more on the political implications related to 
the income distributional issue. They incorporated tax, redistribution, and growth 
in the analysis. They revealed that the inequality of distribution and taxation are 
negatively correlated with economic growth. 
T. Palivos (2009) analyzed the welfare effect of illegal immigration on a dynamic 
general equilibrium model and implied that increasing illegal immigration will be 
benificial to the overall social welfare. However this analysis was not detailed enough 
to see the changes in each group in the economy. Our work is at largely based on the 
study by T. Palivos and Chong K. Yip (2007) . In their analysis, a comprehensive 
distributional analysis (income, wealth, and capital) of two groups of labor was 
examined through the Solow model including the impact of illegal immigration on 
transitional dynamics and steady state. They concluded that the illegal immigration 
is a positive stimulus to the economy as a whole, but the distributional effects are 
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unclear, with opposite forces appearing in the model. Additionally, their simulation 
showed that increasing illegal immigration could highly possibly to worsen the social 
inequality. 
1.4 Outline and Contribution 
As discussed in the literature, the increasing number of illegal immigrants will have 
distributional issues. The supposition is simple. As the number of illegal immigrants 
increases (we assume they are unskilled and the perfect substitute for domestic 
unskilled labors but demand lower salary), domestic unskilled lab or will be paid 
less because in the increasing similar labor supply, while domestic skilled labor will 
relatively get more, which is valid in logical reasoning. However these assumptions 
yet still need to be looked into and clarified in theoretical work. The contribution 
of this study is that we construct the illegal immigration model separately in the 
Solow model and the Ramsey model, and then we clarify and compare the effects of 
illegal immigration on income distribution under each scenario, carefully and clearly 
states the effect of illegal immigration on income distribution and the variations in 
sensitivity analysis. 
Following T. Palivos and Yip (2007) , we build a heterogeneous society with two 
kinds of labors: skilled and unskilled. Illegal immigrants are assumed to be unskilled, 
perfect substitute for unskilled natives and earn less than domestic unskilled workers. 
Government imposes penalty on illegal immigrations. 
Welfare analysis and the income distributional issue is our first concentration. 
We construct a theoretical framework. Both Solow and Ramsey models are em-
ployed. The role of illegal immigration in income distribution in the dynamic eco-
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nomic growth path towards a steady state will be examined. Specifically the income 
distributional effects on the different groups in the economy, for example. the tran-
sitional dynamics of the capital and consumption of the poor and the rich. In this 
analysis , the extent to which that some parameters in the production function, such 
as shares of unskilled workers in the whole labor force and the saving behavior can 
affect the changes of inequality will also be studied. Further more, we will also look 
into the effects of different initial capital endowments of the two types of labor on 
the evolvement of economic growth. Simulations are conducted to provide more 
economic intuition and possible policy implication. 
As suggested by Stiglitz (1969), saving behavior is a determinant of income 
distribution both in the short and long run. Thus we will compare the analytical 
results under two different models to see whether there are fundamental differences. 
This approach will provide us with more detailed information. 
2 The Solow Model of Illegal Immigration 
In this part of the paper, the main purpose is to set up a So low model to examine 
the effect of illegal immigration on the income distribution of the host country. After 
setting up the model, we will discuss the distributional effects in the economy, and 
sensitivity analysis to achieve robustness test. The numerical analysis will give more 
intuition and illustration to answer the research questions. 
The model draws heavily from Palivos and Yip (2007). The major difference is 
that a Cobb-Douglas production function is introduced in the model while Palivos 
and Yip used a general form for production function. 
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2.1 The Basic Model 
In an economy, there are three sectors: firms, consumers, and government. The 
firms produce goods, while the consumers purchase them. The government serves 
as an intermediate role, which in our model is responsible for restricting illegal im-
migrants and transferring the penalty collected from illegal immigrants to individual 
household. Each sector constitutes an important part of the economy. 
For firms , we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs: 
capital, unskilled labor, and skilled labor. 
(1) 
where Y is the output of economy; K is the aggregate capital with unskilled labor 
population L 1 and skilled lab or population L2 ; and M is the population of illegal 
immigrants assumed to be unskilled and thus the perfect substitute for unskilled 
domestic lab or, L 1 . The rationale for this assumption is quite clear because in 
reality, the unskilled foreign labor has more incentive to risk crossing the border 
and seeking higher wages in other countries, thus making them "illegal" .Skilled 
foreign labors like scientists, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals excelling in a 
certain area are actually encouraged to immigrate according to the policy of many 
countries. Illegal immigrants have two features in our model: (1) they are paid 
less than unskilled domestic labors; (2) they are fined by the government by an 
amount of r, which equals the difference between the wages of illegal immigrants 
and unskilled domestic lab or. 
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The profit maximization of firms can be given as 
where r is the capital return; w1 is the wage of L1 ; w2 is the wage of L2 ; Wm is 
the wage of M; and 8 is the depreciation rate of capital. By taking the first order 
condition, we can derive the respective wages of the three inputs in the production 
function as follows: 
(employing CRS, here we can have f = F I L = Aka( cjJ + m)f3 (1 - cjJ )(l - a-(3) , k = 
K I L , m = M I L , l-i = Lil L.) 
Note that cjJ = L1 I L, the ratio of unskilled labor in the total domestic labor 
force. Illegal immigrants are not included. 0 < cjJ < 1. 
The penalty is simply the difference of the wages between the domestic unskilled 
and illegal immigrants. It can actually include various real world situations relating 
to the anti-immigration policy by the government. It can also be the fine charged to 
the employer hiring illegal immigrants , the fine charged to both the employer and 
illegal immigrants, or the fine just charged to immigrants. No matter the case , the 
penalty will ultimately be borne entirely by the immigrants if we assume that the 
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supply of labor is sufficient and perfectly elastic. These assumptions are similar to 
those of Pali vos and Yi p ( 2007). 
Skilled labor earns more than the unskilled; thus we also assume the following: 
< (1- a- (3) f 
l2 
(1-a-(3)(</>+m) 
This condition needs to hold throughout our analytical work. 
The government simply does one thing: collect penalty from illegal immigrants 
and transfer the revenue to the household to ensure a balanced budget. Use T for 
the total revenue and ry for the penalty on each illegal immigrant. For government 
revenue , we have 
T =ryM 
All illegal individuals are assumed to be the same and are subject to pay the 
same amount of fine to the government for being caught; thus dividing two sides 
with total lab or, we have 
T i = ryM/L = rym 
We use T i for the unit penalty and m = M/ L for the ratio of immigrants over total 
labor. 
Consumers in the Solow model exhibit a simple saving behavior: everyone saves 
a constant percentage of his/her salary, which we characterize as sy. s is the saving 
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rate, 0 < s < 1;and y is the individual income, including the three components: 
capital income rk, labor income w, and government transfers Ti. Thus, we have 
where 
W cPW1 + ( 1 - c/J ) 'W2 
cjJ F L 1 + ( 1 - cjJ) F L2 
rf;/3 rj; f + (1 - Q - (3)! 
+m 
2.2 Equilibrium and Transitional Dynamics 
2.2.1 Aggregate level 
The average level of capital and consumption is defined as follows: 
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Using CRS, we have 
sy( k* , m) 
where y(k* , c/J +m) 







f(k*, c/J +m, 1- c/J)- m[f2(k* , c/J +m, 1- c/J)- r ]- 6k* 
s[f(k* , c/J +m, 1- c/J)- m[f2(k* , c/J +m, 1- c/J)- r]- 6k*] 
(c/J +m- m{3 )Ak* 0 ( c/J + m) £3 - 1(1- c/J )(l - o-£3) + mr 
(2) 
Therefore the steady state for the average social capital k* can be solved im-
plicitly in (2). There are many factors affecting the value of k* including all the 
predetermined parameters such as a, 6, c/J, and another parameter of our interest , m , 
which is the ratio of the population of illegal immigration over that of total labor 
in the host country. 
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Dynamics for average capital is as follows: 
sy- bk (3) 
s(rk + w + rm) - bk 
sf( qy(3 +(1-a- (3 ))+(s(aj -6)-b)k+srm 
cP +m k 
sAka(1- qy)(l-a-{3)(c/J + m)f3-1[c/J- (3m +m]- (1 + s)bk + srm 
Transitional dynamics kt exits in (3) , but it cannot be solved explicitly. We will 
rely on calibration to examine the time path of kt. 
2.2.2 Individual level 
Each domestic labor saves syi, where 
(As we assume that the total revenue from the government transfer is distributed 
equally; thus, T i = ~ = rm) 
Similarly, for every group we have 
where Yi 
Set ki = 0, ki can be solved 
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k* = wi +{m 
t ojs-r 
The steady state for the individual is given by 
k* w1 +rm 1 ojs- r (4) 
k* w2+rm 2 ojs- r 
c; ( 1 - s) ( r k2 + w2 + {m) 
Remember that in the steady state we have 
i = 1, 2 
where 













For the steady state k;, two points are noticeable from result ( 4). First, the 
initial capital endowment does not affect k;; second, m has two channels affecting 
k;. One is directly through the numerator, the other is through k*. However, even 
after the differentiation, we still cannot decide on the sign of each component. Thus, 
we will seek the help of calibration to be more specific. 






s(rk1 + w1 + rym)- 6k1 
f f 
s/3 q; + [s(a==- 6)- 6]k1 + srym +m k 
f -
s [f3k + a(4; + m)ki]- (1 + s)6k1 + srym k(4;+m) 
(6) 
s(rk2 + w2 + rym) - 6k2 
f f 
s(1- a- (3 )-- + [s(a==- 6)- 6]k2 + srym 1-4; k 
f -
s [(1- a- f3)k + a(1- 4>)k2]- (1 + s)6k2 + srym k(1-4;) 
We define ""i = ~ as the ratio of the individual capital to the social average 
capital level, "" 1 + ""2 = 2.In other words, when ""i = 1, it means that ki = k,equalling 
the social average level; if ""i < 1, ki is lower than the social average level. By 
observing the changes in ""i, we can find the changes in social wealth inequality. 
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Take log to both sides of ""i = ~ 
(7) 
Dynamics of ""it exists in equation ( 6) implicitly; so again, we need the help of 
calibration to determine the changes of wealth distribution. 
3 Sensitivity Analysis in the Solow Model 
In this section, we will focus on the sensitivity of the previous result to the changes 
in certain parameters of our model. Keeping all the other variables and parameters 
constant, we let one (set of) parameter( s) change in an acceptable range. By this 
way, we not only can test the robustness of previous result, but also try to look into 
the elasticity of different parameters in the illegal immigration model. For example, 
in a developing country endowed with a high ratio of unskilled labor and a developed 
country like the US with a high ratio of skilled labor, what is the difference in the 
illegal immigrants' effects on social welfare? Similar questions can be examined in 
this way. A benchmark example will be given at the beginning. 
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3.1 Benchmark Example 
We set the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas production function equal to 1/3, 
that is, a = (3 = 1/3. This setting is widely accepted in various macroeconomic 
literatures. 
Assume the share of unskilled labor in the totallabor force is 0.5, that is, cjJ = 0.5. 
However, this parameter needs to be discussed, and it may vary in cases in different 
countries and areas. 
Penalty r = 0.25, indicating that illegal immigrants have to pay 25 percent of 
their salary to the government. However in reality, there are various forms of penalty. 
Sometimes illegal immigrants pay a huge amount of money and then probably still 
go to prison. Sometimes the employers are punished for employing illegal labor 
as well. To make life easier, we assume that a quarter of the wage is paid to the 
government as a fine for crossing the border. 
Technology A = 1. Saving rate s is 0.25, and the depreciation rate 5 is 0.04. 
Under these settings, we can easily calculate that steady state value k* = 5.5902. 
Note that the value of initial capital will have no effect on the steady state value, 
which is straightforward from our previous result, and it only affects the transitional 
dynamic of the capital. 
Relationship of k* and ki and m is shown in Figure 1. We can observe that m 
has positive effects on k* , k~, but has negative effects on k;. This result means that 
increase of illegal immigrants can make the economy boom as more labor input is 
presented in the current economy now and then decrease the returns of the domestic 
unskilled labor due to larger supply of total unskilled labor, which relatively increases 
that of skilled lab or. 
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Transitional dynamics when m = 0.2 for (kt, kit , k2t) is shown in Figure 2. (We 
set the initial capital value close to the steady state: k10 = k20 = k* = 5.59. The 
chosen initial value will affect the time path of the capital. In each section of the 
sensitivity analysis, we try to set the initial value close to the steady state because 
we are more interested in the changes before and after the steady state.) We can see 
that all three groups increase and converge to their steady state quickly and then stay 
constant. k2 stays at a high level, while k~ stays at a low level. This is a common 
result in the traditional Solow model, which is within our expectation. 
At time 0, two groups start with same amount of capital. The transitional 
dynamics of kit/ kt in the three different cases in shown in Figure 3. In this graph, 
we observe two types of information: (1) upon every fixed m, skilled labor capital 
share will increase, while that of unskilled will decrease; in other words, the wealth 
inequality will become larger as time goes by. (2) The larger value of m has larger 
effects in worsening social wealth inequality. As we can see, the gap between kit/ kt 
and k2t/ kt is the largest when m = 0.3, and it is the smallest when m = 0.1. Thus 
one conclusion here is that increasing illegal immigration will lead the society to 
larger inequality by making the educated or skilled richer than the less educated. 
3.2 Input Shares 
Let us look into the capital and labor shares first . There are three inputs in our 
production function: capital, unskilled labor, and skilled labor, hence we can have 
multiple combinationd of different ratios with different inputs. In the baseline model, 
each input is given the same share: 1/3. Considering the real economy and the 
assumptions in our model, we select two cases of interest. 
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Case 1 Change a = 1/9, (3 = 4/9 ,so that 1 - a - (3 = 4/9 , which means that by 
comparing the benchmark example, we decrease the ratio of capital in the production 
function while keeping equal shares for two kinds of labor. 
This also satisfies f3c/J < (1- a- f3)(c/J +m). 
Steady state capital k*, k; , and m are shown in Figure 4. Compare with Figure 
1, hardly any difference can be found except that the capital value is lower in every 
point. Thus, the effects of m on k* , k; are the same. 
The transitional dynamics for (k , k1 , k2 ) (m = 0.2) are shown in Figure 5. The 
behavior of the three groups of capital are quite standard, all converging to steady 
state with the skilled staying at a high level and the unskilled at a pretty low level. 
Relationship between m and wealth inequality is shown are Figure 6. Compared 
with Figure 3, the basic information is the same in that the increase of m will still 
expand the social inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. 
Case 2 Change a = 1/4, (3 = 4/9; thus 1 - a - (3 = 11/36, which now means 
the unskilled labor share in the production function is larger than the skilled labor 
share. This usually occurs in the case of the developing countries where labor is 
uneducated and unskilled. 
Relationship between the steady state capital k* , k; and m is shown in Figure 
7. 
Before the node, the condition f3c/J < (1- a - (3 ) ( cjJ +m,) is violated , which means 
that the unskilled earn more than the skilled, and thus kr > k~. However with 
the increasing m , k~ grows much faster than k~ and finally crosses over the later. 
The intuition behind this is that although unskilled labor generates higher returns 
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than skilled lab or, as the inflow of illegal immigration the returns of skilled lab or 
will increase and so will k~ while the returns of k; will decrease gradually. It turns 
out that more accumulations are completed in k~ and finally k; < k~. The crossing 
point is where the two kinds of labor earn the same wages. After the crossing point, 
k2 continues to rise while k; continues to decrease. The initial wealth inequality 
becomes smaller at the beginning, and reverse, and finally, it becomes larger as 
m gets larger. However, as a whole, the aggregate capital level k* keeps rising, 
proving that more inflow of unskilled labor will make the economy boom, which is 
consistent with our previous results. This figure illustrates very well the effects of 
illegal immigration on wealth inequality, in terms of making the skilled wealthier 
and the unskilled poorer. 
No surprising results appear in the transitional dynamics for (k, k1 , k2 ) (m= 
0.2) , which is shown in Figure 8. 
Relationship between m and wealth inequality is shown in Figure 9. Compared 
with Figure 3, it may look strange at the first sight that the unskilled capital is 
higher than the skilled when m = 0.2. This is reasonable because when m = 0.2, 
unskilled labor earns more than the skilled, and k; > k2, which is consistent with 
Figure 7. When m = 0.3 and m = 0.4, the behavior is normal and standard. 
Additionally, the magnitude of curves corresponding to each unit change of m is 
larger than before. 
One conclusion that we can obtain from this part is that although different pa-
rameterizations lead to higher returns for unskilled labor, the inflow of illegal immi-
gration will eventually reverse this situation by making the unskilled poorer and the 
skilled labor richer, and then worsen the social inequality once again. 
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3.3 Share of Unskilled Labor cjJ 
Keeping the other parameter constant as the benchmark example, change cjJ = 0.6. 
We increase the ratio of unskilled labor in the total labor force. Thus the skilled 
labor's ratio is now 0.4. 
Steady state capital k* , k;, and m (no relationship with ki,O and k0 ) are shown in 
Figure 10. Similar as the baseline example, k* and k2 increase, while k~ decreases 
with larger m. However , the speed of k; is smaller now. One possible explanation is 
that the increasing number of unskilled domestic labor actually increases the pool 
for the total unskilled labor, and thus lessens the effect of illegal immigration on 
the decreasing returns of the unskilled labor. In other words, the capital of unskilled 
labor responds slower to changes in m when cjJ increases. 
There is no new information in the transitional dynamics for (k , k1 , k2 ) (m = 
0.2) , as shown in Figure 11. Behavior of the three groups are quite normal. 
Relationship between m and wealth inequality is shown in Figure 12. One sig-
nificant change is that the figures are not symmetric now because there are more 
unskilled labor than skilled labor. Moreover, the magnitude of m's effects on k~ is 
smaller than on k2. The reason for this, is as what was discussed in Figure 10, which 
is the increasing number of unskilled labor makes itself less sensitive to the changes 
in inflow of illegal immigrants. 
3.4 Different Initial Value of Capital 
This section is of great interest to us. We previously assumed that k10 = k2o, 
which is quite standard in research but hardly be true in empirical studies. In the 
macroeconomics, the less educated are always considered to lead a poor life and 
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possess less wealth than the educated people. We will now look into what would 
happen when the two groups are endowed with different values of initial wealth. 
As kw and k20 have no impact on k* and k;, only transitional dynamics will be 
considered in this section of sensitivity analysis. 
Case 1 ~10 < ~20 Keeping the others constant as in the benchmark example, we 
set ~10 = 0.9 , ~20 = 1.1. Skilled labor is endowed with higher initial capital. This 
assumption is common in the real world. Educated people are always supposed to 
be wealthier for being more capable and competent. 
Transitional dynamics in Figure 13 show that all ( k, k1 , k2 ) increase. Note that 
we set the initial value of the aggregate capital equal to the value of the steady 
state capital. Three groups increase in a exactly the same manner and stay at the 
steady state.Nowm let us look at the changes in the wealth inequality in Figure 14. 
When m = 0.1, it seems that the social wealth inequality does not change much, 
but as m, becomes larger, for example 0.2, or 0.3, the wealth inequality expands in 
the transitional dynamics. Apparently the different setting of the initial endowment 
of capital does not change the previous result much. 
Case 2 ~10 > ~20 In this case we reversed previous assumption. We set ~ 10 = 
1.1 , K: 20 = 0.9. Unskilled labor is endowed with a higher initial capital. This is 
quite counterintuitive, but we are still interested to find out what will happen in an 
economy when the less educated are wealthier at the beginning. 
Transitional dynamics of (k , k1 , k2 ) are shown in Figure 15. k1 decreases sharply, 
while k2 increases and runs over k1 . Afterwards , k1 continues to decrease while k2 
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continues to increase until they converge to their steady state. This tells us that 
the unskilled labor is wealthier than the skilled at the beginning of the economy. 
However, because skilled labor earns much more than the unskilled, its relative 
position will reverse eventually and remain as is perpetually. 
Wealth inequality and m in Figure 16 further prove this conclusion in the three 
different levels of m. In Figure 16, after reversing the relative position of k1 and 
k2 , we can observe that illegal immigration once again widens the social wealth 
inequality. If we compare Figure 16 with Figure 14, we can conclude that the 
widened force has the same effects in the same direction, but it is stronger when 
1'1:10 > K20· 
Generally, in the situation of having different initial capital endowments, the 
effects of illegal immigration on wealth distribution are the same. No matter which 
group is endowed with higher wealth, it decreases the returns of unskilled lab or, 
and increase returns to the skilled labor, resulting to an increasing social wealth 
inequality. Further more it will make the skilled much wealthier than the unskilled 
eventually, although the unskilled labor are wealthier at the beginning. However, 
for the whole society, the aggregate capital will continue to rise to steady state due 
to the larger total labor force. 
Figure 15 is quite reasonable in that although the unskilled are endowed with 
higher initial capital, their wealth will decrease and finally lower than that of the 
skilled labor because of lower wage. Figure 23 shows that the increase of illegal 
irnmigration will still increase the inequality of wealth among the different types 
of labor. Let us cite the numerical example of Ramsey under the similar scenario, 
Figure 24, for comparison. One common conclusion is the positive effects of illegal 
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immigration on wealth inequality: the capital of the skilled grows faster than that 
of the unskilled. The larger m is, the faster the convergence speed. One difference is 
that under Solow, skilled capital will cross over the unskilled, and wealth inequality 
continues to enlarge. Divergence exits. While under Ramsey, convergences exits, 
but when m is small, for example, m = 0.1 or 0.2 , there is no crossover. When m is 
larger, crossover occurs. This difference shows that the effect of illegal immigration 
on wealth inequality is small in Ramsey than in Solow in transitional dynamics. 
Possible reason is that in the Ramsey model, people adapt their consumption be-
havior so a large portion of their salary is used to consume rather than to accumulate 
in capital. For example, as m increases and thus wages increases, people consume 
more and save less, which partially offsets the effects of illegal immigration on the 
enlarging of the wealth inequality. 
4 The Ramsey Model of Illegal Immigration 
In this chapter , the Ramsey model is set up to examine the effects of illegal immi-
gration. Similar to the Solow chapter, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. We will 
clarify the effects of illegal immigration in a different scenario, and then conduct a 
comparison afterwards. 
4.1 The Basic Model 
There are three sectors as well in the Ramsey model: firm , household , and gov-
ernment. The initial characterization and role of firm and government are exactly 
the same as in the Solow model. Only the behavior of household is different: in 
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the Solow model, consumption is fixed by a (1-s) proportion of output; in Ramsey, 
every household faces the choice of consumption between the present and the future, 
and we call this elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which is characterized by 
an utility function. Therefore we start from the standard utility function of Ramsey 
model. 
Corresponding with the previous defined two types of labor, we also have two 
types of households. ci is the consumption per household, i = 1, 2. () is the reverse 
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. e-pt is a time-discounting factor with 
a discount rate of p. Every household tries to maximize the utility under a budget 
constraint as equation (8). ki is the capital with a return of r; ki is the capital change 
per capita; w ,i is wage, T is the government transfer, which is from the revenue of 
penalty on illegal immigration, exactly the same as in Solow. Essentially, we are 
employing a standard Ramsey model with an extra T. 
ma.r 2 e-ptdt l oo cl-0 _ 1 0 1- () (8) 
(9) 
The standard equilibrium condition for every household is ( Euler Equation) 




Government's role is the same as in Solow, collecting penalty and transfer them 
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to the household. 
T="'(M 
Firm's production function is as follows: 
The firms try to maximize their profit; thus, the profit maximization problem 
for firms is 
Lagrangian method shows that 
F f 
r = ex- = ex-
K k 
f 
W1 = Wm + "'( = /3--
cp +m 
w2 = (1 - ex - /3 ) -1 -~-cp 
(12) 
The assumption that skilled labor earns more than the skilled also holds; thus , 
FL1 < FL2 (13) 
f\ ~m < (1 - ex- !3 ) ~ 
j3 cp < (1- ex-j3 )( c!J +m) 
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So far we have the basic picture for the Ramsey economy. Generally speaking, 
except for the household characterization and changes that followed afterwards , all 
the other settings and definitions remain the same as in Solow. 
4.2 Transitional Dynamics and Equilibrium 
As usual, we are interested in the steady state value and the transitional dynamics 
of k and c, not only at the aggregate level but also at the individual level, which is 
the main task of this chapter. 
4.2.1 Transitional Dynamics 




k* + ( k0 - k*)eJJ-t 
W- JW 2 -X 
2 
( af) * (1 _ (3m ) 
k l1 +m 
4o: ( 0: - 1) j2 j2 f 
() [k2 - (3m(k2(ZI+m) _,k2)] 
The dynamic growing paths for the individual capital are as follows: 




For the dynamics of consumption, 
where 
-* w'" 
w L[-::L - ~:J + '"YM(1- ~:) 
~~ + w 
~ F - ( F2 - '"Y) M (16) 
w c/Jw1 + ( 1 - c/J )w2 (17) 
{3i measures how Cit evolves as the evolvement of Ct. So far, we were able to 
obtain the baseline result for further analysis. 
4.2.2 Steady State 
Using equation (10) and (12), we can easily calculate the steady state of consumption 
and capital at a social average level. 




The steady state value of capital, k*, is positively related to m. This implies 
that increasing illegal immigration helps to increase the capital accumulation in 
the economy. While the effect on the steady state consumption is ambiguous, two 
components affect the consumption in opposite directions. 
Steady state of the individual capital and consumption are quite complicated. 
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We again use ""i for the convenience of derivation, which has been previously defined 
as the ratio of the individual capital over the social level capital, ""i = i. Thus, ""i 




""1 ,0- H[E/k*- D(Eja + J'm)] 
1 + H[D(QE/a + (1- Q)Fja + J'm)] 
""2,o- H[F/k*- D(Fja + J'm)] 
1 + H[D(QEja + (1- Q)Fja + J'm)] 
L /L E = af3 f F = a(1 -a- {3)! 
1 
' Q+m' 1-Q 
af {3m f3f [k*(1- Q +m)- JL]/[f- m(Q +m-!')] 
ko- k* 1 
k* fL- p 
(20) 
(21) 
Several points should be made clear here, which we can draw from the above 
equations. First, the initial value ( ""1,0 , ""2,0 ) affects the steady state of the individual 
capital, which is different from the results in the Solow model. Second, the effects 
from m are ambiguous, which exhibit opposite forces that affect the changes of 
capitals , but they do not affect the steady state of the total capital and consumption. 
Third, the other parameters are considered. Shares of lab or, ratio of unskilled worker 
in the whole labor force, and consumer behavior are all factors that influence the 
steady state value. Thus , the robustness test is needed for validity and further 
exploration of our framework. 
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5 Sensitivity Analysis in the Ramsey Model 
Each of the following numerical examples includes two parts: transitional dynamics 
of (kt, et) and K,it, and the relationship between k*, c*, k; , c;, and m. The former is 
for the purpose of observation of the evolving behavior both at the aggregate and 
individual levels, while the later is for the examination of the distributional effects 
of illegal immigration, again, both at aggregate and individual levels. 
5.1 Benchmark Example 
We maintain the benchmark parametrization similar to Solow as much as possible: 
inputs shares in production function a = (3 = 1/3; technology A = 1; unskilled 
labor is half of the whole domestic labor force, c/J = 0.5;discounting rate p = 0.02; 
penalty ratio is 25% of wage of unskilled worker; r = 0.25; reverse of elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution e = 1.5. Further more, both types of labor possess the 
same amount of initial capital at the beginning: /'\, 10 = /'\,20 = 1. 
Transitional Dynamics of (kt , Ct) and K,it Dynamics of (kt , et) are shown in 
Figures 17 and 18. Aggregate level capital and consumption rise and converge to 
the steady state. As m changes from 0.1 to 0.3, the time paths of kt and Ct both 
shift upward, which means the value increases at every time point. This proves that 
the increase of foreign labor will increase the social welfare. 
Figure 19 shows the changes in wealth inequality due to the changes in m. 
The increase in illegal immigration will lead to larger wealth inequality, making 
skilled workers richer than the unskilled ones. Although the movements of wealth 
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inequality are in the same direction as in the Solow model, the magnitude is not as 
large as in Solow model, compared with Figure 3. For example, when m = 0.3 at 
t = 100, the ratio of 11: 1,100 : 11:2,100 is approximately 1.02 : 0.98 in Ramsey, but it is 
approximately 1.2 : 0.8 in Solow. From this observation, we can conclude that illegal 
immigration has worsen this social inequality more in transition in the Solow model 
than in the Ramsey model. Why is that? One key factor is the endogenous saving 
feature in the Ramsey model. Households can adjust their consumption between 
the present and the future when their income changes. In other words, the elasticity 
of consumption substitution will respond to the changes in their income, which 
lessens and slows down the wealth inequality. For example, suppose the households 
of unskilled labor anticipates that in the next period, their salary will be lower than 
their expectation; thus they would rationally consume less for the current period and 
save more for the future. These kinds of behavior actually smoothen the "increasing 
wealth inequality" effect of illegal immigration. However, under the Solow model, 
households never respond, and they keep a fixed saving rate all the time. 
Relationship between k*, c* , and m Now, let us shift to the changes in the 
steady state value of capital and consumption with changes of m. Let m ranges 
from 0 to 0.4 as shown in Figure 20. All three groups, k*, k;, and k; all grows 
steadily. The effects on consumption are shown in Figure 21. Both c* and c; increase 
with the increase of m, but ci decreases, although at a very low speed. This is in 
accordance with our previous hypothesis that the unskilled labor household reacts 
to the anticipation of a lower future wage by decreasing current consumption for 
higher savings. Essentially we can conclude from the benchmark calibration that 
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illegal immigration will be a stimulus in booming the economy for the host country, 
making capitals at all levels increasing. While skilled labor gains increases in both 
capital and consumption per capita,the less skilled labor experiences a lower speed 
of growing capital and decreasing consumption per capita. 
5.2 Input Share 
Suppose a = 1/4, (3 = 3/8, 1- a - (3 = 3/8(previously a = (3 = 1/3); other 
parameters remain the same as the benchmark parameterization. This means that 
the input share of capital decreases while the shares of other two inputs (unskilled 
and skilled) equal to each other in production function. This is similar to the cases 
in the developing countries with less natural capital resources and much labor forces. 
Transitional Dynamics of (kt, Ct) and ""it Figure 22 and 23 generally show the 
same trend in the dynamics of ( kt, Ct), both increasing and converging to the steady 
state. The only difference is that both values of kt and Ct are lowered significantly 
than the benchmark. This means the lower capital input there is, the economy grows 
slower with less wealth and consumption. When m is fixed, the wealthy inequality 
in Figure 24 is larger than in the benchmark. In the benchmark, at time 200, "" 10 : 
""2o = 1.04 : 0.96 , but in this example, "" 10 : ""20 = 1.05 : 0.95. This indicates that 
larger labor shares in the production function will enlarge the social wealth inequality. 
However increasing m will still have the power to worsen social inequality. 
Relationship between k*, c*, and m Figures 25 and 26 show the same rela-
tionship for both groups of k* , c* and m compared with the benchmark example. 
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However, the difference is that both scales of k* and c* are smaller than before due 
to less input of capital. 
5.3 Elasticity of Substitution () 
Elasticity of substitution () is a key variable in the household's utility function. 
We choose two alternative values for () : 0.5 and 2.5 (in the benchmark example, 
() = 1.5). () is the reverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, measuring 
the consumption behavior and habit of every household between the present and 
the future. Other parameters remain unchanged as in the benchmark. 
Transitional Dynamics of (kt, Ct) and "'it Figure 27 and 28 shows the same 
transitional dynamics of kt when () = 0.5 and () = 2.5. The smaller () is, the faster 
the convergence speed. Comparison of the transitional dynamics of Ct when() = 0.5 
and() = 2.5 restates this information in Figures 29 and 30. These are also reflected 
in the changes of social inequality if we compare the effects of illegal immigration 
on wealth distribution in Figures 31 and 32. Smaller () will have larger power in 
worsening the social inequality. The reason for this is that when () becomes smaller, 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which characterizes consumer behavior, 
becomes larger. This implies that when the increasing speed of unskilled labor's 
wages go down as a result of illegal immigration inflow, the households respond by 
consuming more in the current period and saving less for the future, which indirectly 
worsens the social inequality. 
Relationship between k*, c*, and m Figures 33 and 34 shows the effects of m 
on k* when () = 0.5 and () = 2.5;while Figures 35 and 36 shows the effects of m on 
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c* when () = 0.5 and () = 2.5. One important difference is that when () = 0.5, the 
gap between k; and k2 is larger than when () = 2.5. On the other hand, similarly, 
the gap between ci and c; is larger than when () = 2.5. 
This is consistent with the conclusion in the transitional dynamics. 
5.4 Penalty Ratio 1 
Suppose r = 0.75; (previous assumption was r = 0.25). We increase the penalty 
ratio to quite a high level; thus the illegal immigrants have to pay 75 percent of their 
wages to the government, which is a heavy punishment. Other parameters remain 
unchanged as in the benchmark. 
Transitional Dynamics of (kt, et) and "'it Figures 37 and 38 shows the similar 
trend in the transitional dynamics of (kt, Ct), with both increasing and then con-
verging to the steady states. The difference is that the capital and consumption 
are lower than in the benchmark in every period of time. The wealth inequality 
in Figure 39 exhibits the similar trend to that in benchmark yet with a smaller 
magnitude. This implies that higher level of penalty will decrease both capital and 
consumption slightly, and improve the social inequality, in a slight manner. 
Relationship between k* , c*, and m Compared with benchmark, Figure 40 
shows the lower skilled capital and a higher unskilled capital, resulting to a smaller 
gap. Figure 41 present the same information. Consumption of the skilled labor is 
lower than before, and the unskilled consumes more, which means that the gap is 
smaller. The reason for the increasing consumption of the unskilled-labor household 
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is the sharp increase of penalty ratio. It implies that the government transfer in-
creases largely, which adds to the household total income. This government transfer 
is so large that it makes the poor people relatively more wealthy than before, and 
this changes the behavior of the household, which lessens the social inequality. This 
implies that higher penalty, or more government transfer will help lessen the social 
wealth inequality, even if the government provides the same amount of money to all 
households, whether rich or poor. 
5.5 Different Initial Value of Capital 
It is interesting when the two types of labor are endowed with different initial capital 
values. Equations (20) shows that ""i,O affects the steady state of "": and thus the 
transitional dynamics of ""i. Of course, this will have no effect on the analysis at 
the aggregate level, which is the same as in the Solow model. In the benchmark 
example, "'It = ""2t = 1. We will examine these cases separately. 
5.5.1 Case 1 ""10 < ""2o 
Set "'It = 0.95 , ""2t = 1.05, with the other parameters remaining the same. Skilled 
labor are richer at the beginning, which is reasonable and has the same context as 
Case 1 in the Solow model. 
Transitional Dynamics of (kt, Ct) and "'it Dynamics of (kt , Ct) are not affected, 
so we go directly to the dynamics of individual capital distribution. 
Figure 42 shows the wealth inequality changes. The increase of the illegal immi-
gration still enlarges the wealth inequality with a similar pattern as in Solow, but 
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the magnitude is smaller. 
When m increases from 0.1 to 0.3, ""2t increases from 1.05 to 1.08 in Ramsey, and 
the range becomes 1.1 to 1.2 in Solow. Apparently illegal immigration has a greater 
force in Solow than in Ramsey, which is also due to the different behaviors of two 
models. Households have the freedom to adopt their consumption habit to respond 
to the changes in wealth, which lessens the force of illegal immigration. This result 
is the same as in our analysis in the benchmark Ramsey. 
Relationship between k*, c*, and m Figure 43 shows that all three groups of 
steady state capital increase, k; with the highest speed and k; with the lowest 
speed. Only one thing changes in the comparison with the benchmark: the path of 
k2 shifts upward paralell, and the path of k; shifts downward paralell. Figure 44 
shows the same information: the path of c; shifts upward paralell, and the path of 
c;: shift downward paralell. If we turn back to the steady state value of k; and c; , 
the magnitude of shift can be calculated by equation (20). 
5.5.2 Case 2 ""10 > ""2o 
Set ~lt = 1.05, ""2t = 0.95 , with the other parameters remaining the same. Unskilled 
labor is richer at the beginning. 
Transitional Dynamics of ( kt , et) and ""it Figure 45 is quite interesting. If we 
compare Figures 45 and 42, it looks like the positions of two groups of curves have 
been interchanged. It can be concluded that although there is a current reverse 
initial capital, the effect of illegal immigration to each particular type of labor is 
the same. However the result now is that wealth inequality decreases first, and then 
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skilled labor becomes richer than the unskilled, making wealth inequality larger 
again. Again, comparing with the case in Solow, this dynamic process takes slower 
and longer in Ramsey because of the flexibility of each household. 
Relationship between k*, c*, and m Again, the situation interchanges between 
skilled labor and unskilled labor. The paths of k~ and ci shift upward paralell, and 
the paths of k2 and c2 shift downward paralell. 
To summarize the sensitivity analysis with different initial capitals, two major 
conclusions have been determined: First, different initial capital endowments in a 
heterogenous society will not essentially affect the trend in wealth inequality. Even 
the unskilled people who are richer at the beginning will become gradually poorer 
as illegal immigration increases, eventually making the skilled lab or richer. Second, 
higher initial capital endowments will increase the steady state values of capital and 
consumption, but the path is still unchanged, which is parallel to the original path. 
6 Comparison and Conclusion 
Let us clarify the results we have so far. Analytical results in both the Solow model 
and the Ramsey model show that illegal immigration has two common effects: First, 
it increases the social level of capital and consumption as more labor input is involved 
in the productions; Second, illegal immigration will worsen the social inequality. 
Increasing unskilled labor supply will make the capital accumulation of the skilled 
labor much faster than themselves, resulting in larger wealth inequality. 
Another important conclusion not found in past literature is the two maJor 
differences between the two models in this study. First, due to endogenous savings, 
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one crucial feature in the Ramsey model that is different with the Solow model is 
that illegal immigration has a smaller power in worsening social inequality. Second, 
we also find that different initial endowments of capital for heterogenous labors will 
affect the effects of illegal immigration on their steady state values. However in the 
Solow model, initial value of capital is irrelevant to the effects of illegal immigration 
on the steady state values. The sensitivity analysis provides more results in greater 
detail. In particular, the sensitivity of several parameters are examined respectively. 
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